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Procedural Adequacy
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch*
There's something admirably stubborn about the Supreme Court's
Amchem opinion.
Despite being presented with the paradigm of
efficiency-a global settlement for present and future claims in the
elephantine asbestos litigation-the Court held that class attorneys could
adequately represent only a class with sufficient cohesion.2 By demanding
cohesion, the Court relied on the adequacy requirement's "identity of
interests" component to buttress Rule 23's commonality and typicality
requirements and tethered the class action to its historic roots in interest
representation.3 Long before the birth of Rule 23, in the mid-1800s, Frederic
Calvert conceived of group litigation as interest representation: one could
represent others with similar interests in a transaction or in the question
presented by the litigation.
Both presently and historically, adequate representation has been
consistently tied to an identity of interests. This tie is constitutionally and
pragmatically grounded. As an extension of constitutional due process,
adequate representation ensures that class representation through attorneys
and representatives is fundamentally fair.5 Plus, an agent is hard pressed to
faithfully represent her principals' interests when those principals have
conflicting ends. Conversely, if an agent's incentives are linked with the

* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law.
1. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
2. Id. at 623.
3. See id. at 623-27; FREDERIC CALVERT, TREATISE UPON THE LAW RESPECTING PARTIES TO

SUITS IN EQUITY 5-7 (1837); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION 198-210 (1987).
4. CALVERT, supranote 3, at 5-7.
5. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law ofClass Actions, 1999 SuP. CT.
REV. 337, 353.
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principals', then adequate representation becomes less worrisome.
Unfortunately, the adequacy inquiry is far from black or white. The line
between conflict of interest and identity of interest becomes increasingly
gray when class counsel represents a largely absent class and must speculate
as to the members' motives, intentions, and desires. Not surprisingly then,
post-Amchem courts have struggled with the adequacy question by searching
for substantial conflicts of interest, attempting to discern the motives and
interests of various groups to pinpoint potential conflict, and determining
whether conflict is "fundamental."
Entering the fray with his latest work, Rethinking Adequacy of
Representation,8 Professor Jay Tidmarsh contends that the Supreme Court's
deontological "identity-of-interests" view in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor9 and Hansberry v. Leelo is unworkable." In this thought-provoking
contribution to the class-action literature, he suggests an alternative metric:
"Representation . . . is adequate if, and only if, the representation makes class

members no worse off than they would have been if they had engaged in
individual litigation."1 2 Summarized as a "'do no harm"' principle, Tidmarsh
casts the alternative as a floor for adequate representation that checks selfinterest and collusion, but requires neither "equality of treatment among class

6. See generally Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomm., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir.
2002) (stressing that the named representative had "an equal incentive to represent both sides so
long as he did not know where his property would end up").
7. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831-32 (1999) (discussing the district court's
review of class-member conflicts); In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 447, 460-61
(N.D. Ala. 2003) (examining class-member conflicts). To defeat a party's claim to class
certification, the conflict must be "fundamental" and targeted at the specific issues in controversy.
7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1768,
at 326 27 (2d ed. 1986). When certain class claims are harmed by the same conduct that benefits
others, a fundamental conflict exists. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181,
1188-89 (i1th Cir. 2003). Scholars have likewise debated the issue, particularly as it relates to
collateral attacks. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson: A
Rawlsian/BehavioralEconomics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279, 283
(2006) (suggesting that collateral attacks be available broadly based on fairness concerns); Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649,
1651 (2008) (attempting to provide a framework for establishing finality in class-action litigation in
light of the parameters for collateral attacks); Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The
InadequateAssessment ofAdequacy in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687
(2004) (reviewing class-action adequacy issues); Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral
Attack for InadequateRepresentation in Class Suits, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 383 (2000).
8. Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEXAS L. REV. 1137, 1151-58
(2009).
9. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
10. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
11. Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 1151-58. As Professor Tidmarsh has noted in the past, the
Amchem settlement failed in part because it did not satisfy the adequacy-of-representation
requirement and in part because it failed Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. JAY
TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES
27-29 (1998).
12. Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 1139.
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members" nor that "the gains from class treatment . . . be distributed among

claimants in proportion to the strength and extent of their claims."13 Using
his alternative principle means that class counsel need not promote the
greatest good for each class member or for the class as a whole.14 Plus,
collusion would be tolerable so long as it does not make class members
worse off than they would have been by litigating individually.15 In short,
Professor Tidmarsh would sever representation from the interests represented
such that the motives of neither class counsel nor the class representative
matter. What matters instead is the bottom line: the results. Regardless of
motivations, intentions, or collusion, representation is adequate so long as
members are not worse off than they would have been by individually
controlling their cases.
Professor Tidmarsh grounds this alternative class-action maxim in
joinder more broadly. He construes the philosophical underpinnings for
allowing plaintiffs to further their own self-interest in making joinder
decisions as essentially egoist or utilitarian. 17 When viewed alongside other
joinder rules that encourage plaintiffs to make self-interested decisions, Rule
23 is an oddity. It requires class counsel and the class representative to
advance the interests of class members, which includes "maximizing the net
value of the group of claims," "compensating each claimant appropriately,"
"and enabling claimants to voice their concerns." 18 Yet, according to
Professor Tidmarsh, as in other joinder decisions, the egoist representative
brings a class action to advance her own interests, which makes her
"ultimately indifferent to the interests" of those she represents.19 Because a
representative may rationally invoke the class vehicle to further her own
ends, not all of Rule 23 is out of sync with the other joinder rules-just the
adequacy requirement. On the whole then, Rule 23 is consequentialist
because it "is principally concerned with preventing certain harms to
potential class members, to the defendant, or to society." 20 The adequacy-ofrepresentation doctrine, however, has "a deontological ring to it" as a "dutybased requirement that must be satisfied regardless of the consequences." 2 1
Cast in this stark contrast, the adequacy requirement seems at odds with both
the remainder of Rule 23 and the joinder rules more broadly.

13. Id. at 1191.
14. Id. at 1179.
15. Id
16. Id. at 1180. The "do no harm" principle "measures the adequacy of the actions of class
representatives and class counsel solely in terms of their effects on class members." Id.
17. Id. at 1143-44.
18. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.04 (Proposed
Final Draft 2009).
19. Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 1150.
20. Id. at 1156.
21. Id
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In this brief Response, I explore Professor Tidmarsh's "do no harm"
approach from a procedural legitimacy perspective. I begin by considering
the assumption underlying his alternative, namely that in any given class
action both attorneys and class representatives tend to act as self-interested
homo economicus, and we must therefore tailor the adequacy requirement to
curb self-interest only insofar as it makes class members worse off than they
would be with individual litigation. Adopting the "do no harm" principle as
our yardstick for adequate representation is alluring-it removes motivations
and morality from the equation and avoids the stickiness that those
calculations entail. Plus, Professor Tidmarsh's careful treatment of the
philosophical and economic arguments underlying the joinder rules make a
compelling argument for the change. My concern, however, is two-fold: (1)
tailoring adequacy to egocentric behavior by providing a floor to minimally
acceptable conduct creates a troubling anchor that is at odds with agency and
ethical principles; and (2) this proposed change, particularly as it tolerates
collusion and unequal treatment among class members, may adversely
impact perceptions of procedural justice and class-action legitimacy.
Professor Tidmarsh designs the "do no harm" principle as a limit on
self-interested behavior by class counsel and class representatives and thus
discounts the possibility that they might act from external constraints such as
22
moral duties, altruism, or virtue.
Yet, empirical studies across numerous
disciplines have shown that we do not always act as homo economicus,
purely economically motivated, self-interested individuals.2 3 In fact, we're a
rather heterogeneous population that tends to act with mixed motives
depending on social norms, social cues, and context. We donate blood for
free, volunteer our time, and give our money to charities. Studies regularly
show that people act altruistically, listen to their moral conscience, and prefer
fairness and reciprocity. 24 The studies also suggest that stimuli exist apart
from incentives and sanctions and that we experience nonmaterial gains and

22. Id. at 1179, 1181-82 (noting that "[n]othing prevents a class representative or class counsel
motivated by notions of fairness or justice from trying to make class members better off," but
aligning the "do no harm" principle with other "egoist joinder behavior").
23. See Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory ofFairness,Competition, and Cooperation,
114 Q.J. ECON. 817, 818 (1999) (noting several examples of research in which subjects defect from
the self-interest model); see also Mizuho Shinada & Toshio Yamagishi, Bringing Back Leviathan
into Social Dilemmas, in NEW ISSUES AND PARADIGMS IN RESEARCH ON SOCIAL DILEMMAS 93, 94

(A. Biel et al. eds., 2008).
24. See Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 169, 175-76 (1980)
(discussing how people will take into account the payoff to others in evaluating the utility of an
action); Shinada & Yamagishi, supra note 23, at 94. See generally Mark Van Vugt et al.,
Competitive Altruism: A Theory of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Groups, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 531, 531 (R.I.M. Dunbar & Louise Barrett eds.,

2007).
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losses based on our personal identity as well as our ethical and moral
125
values.
Given the array of motivations that compel action, tailoring the
adequacy-of-representation standard to self-interested attorneys and
representatives changes expected and permissible behavior across the board.
Catering to self-interested egoists may dampen pro-social behavior and, in
turn, have negative externalities on agency relationships, ethics, and
procedural legitimacy. Initial ideas, standards, and suggestions about the
right answer or how a judgment should be made can have a disproportionate
26
effect on the resulting decisions. Adopting a "do no harm" principle as the
standard for adequate representation sends the wrong message: It tells
attorneys and class representatives that they are doing a fine job so long as
they avoid making class members worse off than they would have been with
individual litigation. It gives them little incentive to determine what class
members' interests are (and whether they conflict) or to faithfully represent
those interests. When a standard for adequacy tells us that acting from our
own self-interest is permissible (so long as we do not make those whom we
represent worse off) and that we can treat our principals as a means to our
own end, then we may rationalize abandoning our moral and ethical duties to
act as faithful agents. 27
Even if representatives resist the pull to disregard their moral and
ethical obligations, a consequentialist view of adequate representation may
negatively affect views about procedural legitimacy. Although Professor
Tidmarsh eloquently and persuasively provides reasons for his proposal, it
intuitively conflicts with values embedded in our legal culture, namely, that
attorneys should achieve the best results for their clients, and agents should
faithfully pursue their principals' interests.28 As he anticipates, his principle

25. See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Why Social Preferences Matter--The Impact of Nonselfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives, 112 ECON. J. Cl, C2-C3 (2002)
(arguing that economists should accept a heterogeneity principle in social preferences); Tom R.
Tyler & David De Cremer, Cooperation in Groups, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 155,
157 (David De Cremer et al. eds., 2006) (noting that social motivations may be found empirically
separate from material gain or loss).
26. A paradigmatic example asks people to think of the last three numbers in their phone
number, to then add 400 to that number and imagine that number as a year. When they are then
asked whether Attila the Hun was defeated before or after that date and in what year they would
guess that Attila the Hun was actually defeated, people's guesses are strongly influenced by the
dates suggested from their phone numbers. Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Anchoring,
Activation, and the Construction of Values, 79 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 115,
116 (1999).
27. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 31

(Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785) ("1 say that the human being and in
general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or
that will at its discretion . . . .").
28. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (1983) ("Loyalty and

independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client.").
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is unappealing to those who subscribe to a Kantian or virtue-ethics view.29
But there is more at stake than moral consensus.
To put it plainly, requiring only a behavioral floor for private attorneys
performing quasi-governmental functions may threaten the already tenuous
30
public support for class actions. Because class-action litigation is, in many
respects, public-law litigation (think tobacco, asbestos, handguns, and
prescription drugs), public faith in the system as legitimate and authoritative
is critical.
When litigants believe that their views have been faithfully
represented and fairly presented, they tend to have confidence in the process
and are more likely to comply with the outcome. 32 One setting out to hire an
attorney rarely seeks to retain an agent who will not make her worse off.
Rather, we prefer the best attorney that we can afford, one who will work
diligently to achieve the best outcome. Yet, in the class context, class
members "cannot tell the lawyers how to handle their cases, they cannot fire
the lawyers for disobedience or poor performance, they can rarely if ever sue
for malpractice, and they have little control of settlement."33 In short, the

29. Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 1180 n.181.
30. The public already perceives class counsel (and class actions) as abusing their power. See
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 371-72 (2000) ("Where once [class actions
were] viewed as empowering class members, increasingly [they are] seen as entrapping them.");
Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment
Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEXAS L. REv. 1249, 1326 (2003) ("The current
situation marks a dramatic change from the past, when class action employment discrimination
litigation was thought to represent one of the hallmarks of public law litigation, brought by lawyers
who were primarily interested in pursuing justice rather than profit."); see also Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, CAFA 's Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2522 (2008)
(noting that class actions serve a policing function in several areas such as securities and Fair Credit
Reporting Act litigation).
31. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 62-63 (2007)

(noting that Congress may fail to act in some areas such as asbestos litigation and thus class-action
litigation may be an alternative means for promoting reform); David Marcus, Some Realism About
Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 1949, 1959 (2008) (reviewing and commenting on Nagareda's book
and asking why private lawyers should be engaged in law reform through litigation). If, for
example, the public considers a particular law or judicial opinion illegitimate, then it can rationalize
noncompliance. See Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 277-82
(2004) (discussing, in part, "the case that a right of participation is essential for the legitimacy of a
final and binding civil proceeding"); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A
Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 874 (1997)
("Citizens are very forgiving of those who take the law into their own hands, since they feel that the
law is not working.").
32. Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183, 1198 (1982)
("Parties who believe that their perspectives have been fairly presented may also display more
confidence in the judicial process and greater willingness to abide by its results.").
33. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION

(Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005).

§

1.04, at 14-22
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only "guarantee" class members have is the adequate-representation
requirement.34
Further, to the extent that the "do no harm" principle permits unequal
treatment among similarly situated claims, it runs afoul of the cardinal
procedural-justice rule that like claims should be treated alike. As Professor
Tidmarsh notes, the principle is designed to "check self-interest and collusion
that makes class members worse off' and is thus "a minimal principle, rather
than a maximal version of adequacy that requires the gains from class
treatment to be distributed among claimants in proportion to the strength and
extent of their claims.
To be sure, his rationale is pragmatic:
administering a system with an "'equal gains for equal claims"' principle has
high transaction costs in terms of information collection and tricky
calculations about what claims are or aren't "equal."3 6
The concern,
however, is equally pragmatic: if outcomes are random or appear biased, then
litigants will lose their faith in the system, refuse to comply with judgments
they deem illegitimate, and may look for alternative self-help enforcement
methods. As Bill Rubenstein explains, "Our commitment to this form of
equality is, again, a commitment to a particular instrumental form of
equality. Outcome equality is important because it is evidence of a
consistent, and hence legitimate, dispute resolution system."3 8 In that sense,
the joinder rules are not simply egoist; they (along with preclusion doctrine)
facilitate consistent results among similar cases and promote procedural
-39
justice.
If the adequacy requirement is indeed out of step with the rest of Rule
23, it remains aligned with agency and professional-responsibility principles.
Consider, for instance, other checks on the attorney-client relationship in the
class context: contingency fees roughly align the lawyer's interests with her
clients; rules of professional conduct impart duties of loyalty and provide
structural safeguards when conflicts of interest threaten that duty;40 and

34. Granted, other doctrines may perform similar functions, such as the requirement that
settlements be "fair, reasonable, and adequate." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), infra notes 40-45 and
accompanying text.
35. Tidmarsh, supra note 8, at 1191.
36. Id. at 1192.
37. William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1865, 1893 (2002).
38. Id.
39. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, ProceduralJustice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2009) (explaining the importance of fair process in large-scale litigation).
40. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rs. 1.7-1.11, 1.7 cmts. 1-4 (1983). As
mentioned at the beginning ofthis Response, some conflict within the class is tolerated. See Bash v.
Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[C]onflicts of interest are built
into the device of the class action, where a single lawyer may be representing a class consisting of
thousands of persons not all of whom will have identical interests and views.").
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judges appoint class counsel, monitor her conduct, and approve her fees.41
Plus, the hope remains that the reputations of those within the class-action
plaintiffs' bar as well as their law firms will endure over time such that
judges will continue to appoint the best and most faithful agents to represent
the class. 42 Moreover, even if we divorce the adequacy requirement from its
moorings in representing those with related interests, the typicality
requirement remains.43 To satisfy typicality, class representatives must have
"claims or defenses" that "are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,"
which ensures that interests align. 4 But all of this means that other
doctrines, which are out of sync with a "do no harm" approach, must
shoulder added weight. And if that is true, it suggests that agency and
professionalism rules may maintain the status quo even if courts did adopt a
"do no harm" approach.45
The harder question is what conception of adequacy of representation
best comports with procedural justice in a just society. It is a question that
continues to perplex modern-day American courts as they struggle with a
rule that sometimes treats individual rights as if they were held collectively. 46
In so doing, they have saddled the adequacy concept with various, often
incompatible, meanings. It is tempting then to adopt a "do no harm"
standard that tolerates conflicts of interest and provides a clear reference
point for the financial, legal, and mental calculations that adequacy of
representation entails. Yet, public perception of procedural fairness demands
that we require more of our class counsel and class representatives than this.
Perhaps other doctrines, such as the need for a settlement to be fair,

41. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform Is Not Enough: Assuring
More than Merely "Adequate" Representation in Class Actions, 38 GA. L. REV. 927, 961 (2004)
("Class counsel's adequacy of representation is, ultimately, an ethical determination that includes
consideration of the Model Rules provisions governing competence, diligence, communication, and
conflicts of interest."). See generally Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics 6-7
(John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 92, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tatabstract id=204872 ("Agency problems arise whenever one
individual (the agent) can benefit another individual (the principal) by taking a certain action, but
the latter cannot directly monitor the first and pay him for doing the right thing.").
42. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L.
REv. 1707, 1707, 1714-15 (1998) ("Lawyers can organize into firms that develop substantial
reputations for quality and integrity over many years. To preserve their reputations, firms develop
ways to monitor and screen their lawyers.").
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
44. Id. See generally Wiener v. Dannon Co., 255 F.R.D. 658, 666-67 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(holding that the putative class representative was not typical because she purchased only one of the
products at issue).
45. See Bassett, supra note 41, at 959-83. But see Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class
Action Lawyers?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1477, 1482-87 (arguing that the class should be viewed as
an entity and that ethical conflict of interest rules should not apply to conflicts within a class).
46. See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 10-11 (2009) (discussing the considerations of

individual rights surrounding the 1966 amendment to Rule 23).
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reasonable, and adequate, will do the heavy lifting, but so much rides on the
adequacy-of-representation determination-class-action legitimacy, due
process, participation opportunities, and preclusion, to name a few-that I
am not yet ready to abandon the need for identity of interests.

